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Disrespectful, Offensive, Boorish &
Decidedly Immature Behavior Is Not
Sufficient to Meet the Requirements of
Title VII
Duncan v. General Motors Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent law school graduate has just passed the bar exam and is ready to
begin her first job as a licensed attorney at a prestigious law firm. Within the
first few weeks of employment, one of the managing partners asks her to lunch.
While at lunch he mentions an affair he is having with another associate. The
partner also divulges to the young associate his marital problems and then he
propositions her for a sexual relationship. The young associate refuses and
leaves. After the initial request, the partner never propositions the young
associate again; however, after the incident, the partner becomes increasingly
critical of her work product mid insults her by saying an inexperienced paralegal
would do a betterjob. Over the next two years the partner subjects the associate
to other offensive behavior including hanging a poster at work describing the
"Man Haters Club of America," naming the associate as the President and CEO
and listing a requirement that all members "must be in control of sex." In
addition, the partner's screen saver is a picture of a naked woman, and he tells
the associate she is to type certain items on his computer because it is the only
one with the necessary software. Located on his desk is a penis-shaped pacifier
as well as a planter in the shape of a man with a cactus protruding from his
unzipped pants. Furthermore, on several occasions, the partner inappropriately
brushes the associate's hand when she is handing him documents. This behavior
not only makes the associate uncomfortable, but also intimidates her and
humiliates her in front of her peers.
It does not seem unreasonable that a judge or jury could find this behavior
sufficiently severe or pervasive to warrant a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. This is just a hypothetical situation, but in Duncan v. General
Motors Corp.,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that ajury could not reasonably find similar circumstances so severe or pervasive
to alter the terms or conditions of employment in the context of an automobile
factory.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that when considering whether
conduct reaches the threshold of actionable sexual harassment it is necessary to
1. 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1789 (2003).
2. Id.
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look at the totality of the circumstances.3 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") also advances this approach.4 However, a circuit split
exists in applying the totality of the circumstances approach. One approach
includes considering the work environment as part of the totality of the
circumstances, while the other approach specifically rejects considering whether
the environment is blue-collar or professional.5 This Note explains that while the
Eighth Circuit has not specifically adopted one approach, it seems apparent from
Duncan that the court takes into consideration the specific work atmosphere.
This Note also examines whether the standard is discriminatory in and of itself.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Diana Duncan filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646
against her employer, General Motors Corporation ("GMC").' Duncan claimed
she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, James Booth, from two weeks after
she was hired in August 1994 until the time she quit in May 1997.!
More specifically, Duncan alleged that Booth requested a meeting with her
at a local restaurant two weeks after she was hired, where he disclosed to her his
then-current affair and marital problems.9 Booth then propositioned Duncan,
requesting that she engage in a sexual relationship with him. Duncan denied
this request and left the restaurant." This was the only attempt by Booth to
3. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Meritor
Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
4. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (2001).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e- 17 (2000). Duncan also filed suit under the Missouri
Human Rights Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-.137 (2000). However, the court
analyzed the claims under Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act using the same
legal standards. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 930, 931 n.2.
7. It is debated whether GMC was actually Duncan's employer because Duncan
was placed at GMC through a program at the Junior College District of St. Louis.
Duncan, 300 F.3d at 930. Duncan had two supervisors, Reese through the College, and
Booth at GMC. Id. For the purposes of this case the court decided not to rule on the
issue and assumed that GMC was the actual employer of Duncan. Id. at 933.
8. Id. at 930-31. Although the court does not address who hired Duncan, it is
interesting to note that Duncan attained her position at GMC through her acquaintance
with Booth. Id. at 931. Duncan was working as a bartender and waitress at Booth's
country club and Booth asked her if she knew anyone who would be interested in the
position. Id. She stated that she was and he brought her the necessary paperwork. Id.
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proposition Duncan for a sexual relationship.' 2 Duncan confronted Booth about
his behavior the following day at work, at which time he apologized.'3 Duncan
alleged that after the incident at the restaurant Booth became hostile toward her
and more critical of her work; however she admitted that Booth was critical of
other employees as well, including her male counterparts.'
4
Another instance of alleged inappropriate behavior entailed Booth requiring
Duncan to use his computer on which there was a screen saver of a naked
woman because, he claimed, his computer was the only computer with the
necessary software.' In addition, Duncan alleged that Booth unnecessarily
touched her hand when she passed him the phone on four or five occasions. 6
Duncan also claimed that Booth kept a pacifier that was shaped like a penis in
his office. 7 Booth showed this penis-shaped pacifier to his coworkers on
occasion, and on two occasions showed the pacifier to Duncan specifically.'
Furthermore, Duncan claimed that Booth placed a planter in his office that
was in plain view of everyone who entered the office. The planter, shaped like
a slouched man wearing a sombrero, had a hole in the front of the man's pants
where a cactus protruded.'9 Duncan accused Booth of directing her to draw the
planter to prove her artistic skills when she requested a pay increase and
promotion to an illustrator's position.20 Duncan refused to draw the planter
because previous applicants for the illustrator's position were only required to
draw automotive parts.2'
Booth also created a "recruitment" poster for the "Man Hater's Club of
America" that he displayed on the bulletin board in Duncan and Booth's work
area.22 Booth named Duncan as President and CEO of the Club, and listed




14. Id. The criticism included telling Duncan that she was "incompetent and that







20. Id. at 931-32.
21. Id. at 932. Duncan later learned that she was unqualified for the position
because she did not have a college degree. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The poster listed the club's membership requirements as: "'Must always
be in control of: (1) Checking, Savings, all loose change, etc.; (2) (Ugh) Sex; (3) Raising
children our way!; (4) Men must always do household chores; (5) Consider T.V. Dinners
2004]
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Duncan also alleged that Booth and another employee arranged for Duncan
to be "arrested" while at work as part of a charity event." A fellow employee
explained the event to Duncan and she left with the "police officer," only to be
released upon a financial donation by Booth to the charity.2" After having
Duncan released, Booth allegedly took Duncan to a bar instead of to work
despite her protests.26
Booth's alleged inappropriate behavior did not stop there. Duncan claimed
that on May 5, 1997, Booth directed Duncan to type a draft of the "He-Men
Women Hater's Club,"27 which she refused to type.2" Duncan resigned from
GMC two days later.29
GMC conceded all of these facts, but claimed that Booth's behavior, which
resulted in an offensive and disagreeable atmosphere, was directed at both
female and male employees. Thus, GMC asserted that the sexual discrimination
claim failed because the harassment was not directed toward Duncan, or women
in general, because of gender.30 GMC further argued that the "alleged
harassment was not so severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or
privilege of Duncan's employment."'"
The district court jury found in favor of Duncan and awarded her over one
million dollars in damages and back pay.32 GMC unsuccessfully sought
judgment as a matter of law.33 GMC then appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which reversed the lower court's finding and




27. The beliefs included:
* Constitutional Amendment, the 19th, giving women [the] right to vote
should be repealed. Real He-Men indulge in a lifestyle of cursing, using
tools, handling guns, driving trucks, hunting and of course, drinking
beer.
* Women really do have coodies [sic] and they can spread.
" Women [are] the cause of 99.9 per cent of stress in men.
" Sperm has a right to live.
* All great chiefs of the world are men.




30. Id. at 933-34.
31. Id. at 934.
32. Id. at 930-31. More specifically, Duncan was awarded "$4600 in back pay,
$700,000 in emotional distress damages on her sexual harassment claim, and $300,000
in emotional distress damages on her constructive discharge claim." Id.
33. Id. at 931.
[Vol. 69
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/11
TITLE VII
granted GMC's motion for judgment as a matter of law.34 The Eighth Circuit
held that although Booth acted in a "boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly
immature" manner, the behavior did not create "an objectively hostile work
environment permeated with sexual harassment."35  Even though Booth's
behavior made Duncan uncomfortable and embarrassed, it was not enough to
constitute actionable sexual harassment. Because Duncan failed to prove the
behavior in the aggregate was so severe and extreme that a reasonable person
would find the terms or conditions of her employment had been altered, she was
ultimately unsuccessful.36
IM. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Foundation: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect individuals from
hostile work environments and unlawful employment practices.37 The original
purpose of Title VII was "to eliminate... discrimination in employment based
on race, color, religion, or national origin."3" Sexual discrimination was not
included in the original draft of Title VII, but was added at the last minute on the
floor of the House of Representatives.39 Even though Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on sex, it does not prohibit all sex-related activity in the
34. Id. at 936.
35. Id. at 935.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(a) reads in full:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
39. JuDrrH A. BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw: THE STRUGGLE TOwARD
EQUALrrY FROM THENEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT 77 (3d ed. 2002). The original Title VII
did not address sex discrimination. The amendment adding "sex" was proposed by an
opponent of civil rights who urged his colleagues "to protect our spinster friends in their
'right' to a husband and family." Id. The last minute joke failed when a group of female
legislators saved the amendment. Id.
2004]
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work environment; sexual conduct in the work setting that does not alter the
terms of employment does not reach the level necessary for a Title VII claim °.
B. The United States Supreme Court Interprets Title VII
1. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Constitutes Discrimination
In 1986 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address sexual
harassment standards in the work place in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson." In Meritor the plaintiff, Vinson, alleged that her supervisor, Taylor,
invited her out to dinner and requested they go to a hotel to engage in sexual
relations.42 At first, Vinson refused to participate, but out of "fear of losing her
job she eventually agreed.""3 Vinson also testified that following the initial
incident Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors, both during work and
after business hours." Furthermore, Vinson testified that over the next several
years she had intercourse with Taylor forty to fifty times, he fondled her in front
of coworkers, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her while at work, and forcibly raped her.4" For the
first time, the Supreme Court stated that a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim is a form of discrimination under Title VII and held that Taylor's behavior
constituted such discrimination." The Court went on to say that the purview of
Title VII is not confined to "economic" or "tangible discrimination" and the
EEOC guidelines support the conclusion that economic injury is not necessary
to violate Title VII.47 The Court did not define a standard describing what sexual
harassment constituted a violation of Title VII. It stated: "For sexual harassment
to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."' 48
40. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un) Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REv. 733,734 (2002) (citing Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-05 (11 th Cir.
1982)).
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59.




46. Id. at 57-58.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
[Vol. 69
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2. Severe and Pervasive, but Not Affecting Psychological Well-Being
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of the hostile work environment standard.50 In Harris, the plaintiff filed a
Title VII action against her former employer alleging that on several occasions
and in front of other employees, the President of Forklift Systems said to her,
"You're a woman, what do you know," "We need a man as the rental manager,"
and told her on at least one occasion that she was "a dumb ass woman."'" In
addition, the plaintiff, Harris, alleged that Hardy, Forklift Systems' owner,
suggested in front of other employees that she "go to the Holiday Inn [with
Hardy] to negotiate [her] raise."52 According to Harris, Hardy had requested that
she, as well as other female employees, retrieve coins from the front pockets of
his pants." Furthermore, Harris alleged that Hardy tossed things on the ground
in front of her and other female employees and ask them to bend over and pick
them up.54 Harris eventually spoke to Hardy about his offensive behavior, and
Hardy apologized, stating that he was just joking, and it would not happen
again." Because of Hardy's promise, Harris agreed to stay on the job.56
According to Harris, Hardy's behavior changed for approximately one month."
However, Harris claimed that while she was negotiating a deal with one of
Forklift Systems' customers, Hardy said to her in front of other employees,
"What did you do, promise the guy... some [sex] Saturday night?"58 This was
the last straw for Harris. She collected her final paycheck and quit.59
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
dismissed the action."° The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
upheld the dismissal on the grounds that the conduct was not so severe or
pervasive to affect Harris' psychological well-being or cause her injury.6' Thus,
according to the Sixth Circuit, Hardy's conduct did not create an actionable
49. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
50. For a thorough discussion of the hostile environment standard see Michael J.
Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 437 (2002).
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hostile work environment claim under Title VU.62 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari s and reversed and remanded the case, stating that the standard takes
"a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."" The Court
went on to say that "[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one
that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often
will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers." '65 Thus,
even though conduct that could seriously affect a reasonable person's
psychological well-being is actionable under Title VII, reaching that level of
behavior is not the threshold requirement. 6
3. Social Context and the Totality of the Circumstances
In Oncale the Supreme Court discussed the social context of sexual
harassment in a hostile work environment case.67 Oncale was unique because
the Court was asked to address the issue of whether same-sex harassment was
actionable under Title VII." The Court held that same-sex harassment was
prohibited by Title VII.6 Furthermore, Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
protects men as well as women."0 The Oncale decision was also significant
because the Court stressed the need to look at the social context of the alleged
harassment.7 The Court stated that the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.72 were still applicable and emphasized a point previously made in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson:" "The trier of fact must determine the
existence of sexual harassment in light of'the record as a whole' and 'the totality
of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context
in which the alleged incidents occurred."'74 The Court stated that judging the
behavior within its cultural context would prevent Title VII from becoming a
62. Id.
63. Id. at 20.
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id.
67. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 78.
71. Id. at 81-82.
'72. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
73. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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code of general civility in the workplace and would guard against imposing
liability for behavior that does not reach the necessary level of severeness and
pervasiveness." More specifically, the Court stated:
We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position, considering "all the circumstances."
In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs
and is experienced by its target. A professional football player's
working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for
example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the
field-even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office.
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive."6
Although the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of analyzing the alleged
sexual harassment in light of social context, it did not specifically explain what
"social context" meant." The term "social context" can and has been interpreted
by courts to mean many different things.78
75. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-8 1.
76. Id. at 81-82 (citations omitted).
77. See generally id.
78. Frank, supra note 50, at 451-65.
2004]
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C. The Circuit Split Regarding the "Social Context" Standard
1. The Tenth Circuit Approach
In Gross v. Burgraff Construction Co.79 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit applied the standard set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Meritor, which required courts to look at the totality of the
circumstances. The court started its analysis by recognizing that sexual
harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive, altering the terms or
conditions of the victim's employment to be actionable."0 The Tenth Circuit also
noted that when deciding whether sexual harassment occurred the court should
look at the record as a whole and must look at the totality of the circumstances."
This would include the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which
the alleged incidents occurred. 2 In light of this precedent the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that "[i]n the real world of construction work, profanity and
vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive," and "[i]ndelicate forms of
expression are accepted or endured as normal human behavior.""a The court
concluded that when appraising the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim it
must do so in the context of a blue collar work environment where crude
language is used often.8 The court also reasoned:
"[T]he standard for determining sex[ual] harassment would be
different depending upon the work environment. Indeed, it cannot
seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual
conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not
meant to-or can--change this. It must never be forgotten that Title
VII is the federal mainstay in the struggle for equal employment
opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite
79. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). The alleged incidents of harassment by the
plaintiff's supervisor included referring her as a "cunt"; stating over the CB radio
"sometimes, don't you just want to smash a woman in the face"; yelling at her, "What
the hell are you doing? Get your ass back in the truck and don't you get out of it until I
tell you"; referring to her as "dumb"; using profanity in reference to her; generally
disliking women unless they were between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five and
weighed less than 115 pounds; and threatening retaliation against plaintiff because he
was under the impression that she was going to file an EEOC claim against him. Id. at
1536.
80. Id. at 1537.
81. Id. (citing Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1538.
[Vol. 69
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different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.""5
2. The Sixth Circuit Approach
In Williams v. General Motors Corp.,86 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the Tenth Circuit's approach.87 The
Sixth Circuit, however, adopted the application of "totality of the circumstances"
test that requires the court to look at the accumulated effect of the harassing
behavior, instead of determining if isolated incidents meet the severe or
pervasive standard. 8 In rejecting the Tenth Circuit's approach, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that a woman, does no give up the right to be tree from sexual
harassment because she decides to work in a male-dominated trade.8 9 The court
concluded that the Tenth Circuit's reasoning was "illogical, because it means
that the more hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the
more difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment."90 The
Sixth Circuit also reasoned that this logic allows courts to impose an
"assumption of the risk" liability upon women entering male-dominated fields.9
85. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F.
Supp. 419,430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)).
86. 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
87. Id. at 564.
88. Id. at 562-63. More specifically the court stated:
"The [severe or pervasive] analysis cannot carve the work environment
into a series of discrete incidents and measure the harm adhering in each
episode. Rather, a holistic perspective is necessary, keeping in mind that each
successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate
incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created thereby may
exceed the sum of the individual episodes."
Id. at 563 (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524
(M.D. Fla. 1991)).
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Duncan v. General Motors Corp.92 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit was faced with deciding whether disturbing, boorish and
embarrassing behavior that occurred over several years was enough to meet the
high threshold of the Harris" standard, which requires behavior to be so severe
or pervasive that a reasonable person would find the environment abusive and
hostile.94 The Eighth Circuit held Booth's harassment was not so severe or
pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of Duncan's employment,
and, therefore, Duncan failed to prove a prima facie case.95 Thus, the court
overturned the jury award, totaling over one million dollars, and it granted the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.96
The Eighth Circuit's analysis addressed each element necessary to succeed
on a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.97 The plaintiff must
show that "she was a member of a protected group, that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and that
the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment."9 The
court noted that it was undisputed that Duncan satisfied the first two
requirements necessary to succeed on the hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim.99 The court also concluded that the harassment of Duncan by
Booth was based on gender, even though Booth's behavior was at times directed
at both males and females.'00
The court stated that unlawful discrimination does not occur when the
atmosphere is offensive, unless one gender is treated differently than the other.'0 '
92. 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1789 (2003).
93. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
94. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 933-34.
95. Id. at 934-35.
96. Id. at 933. "Judgment as a matter of law is proper 'when all the evidence points
in one direction and is susceptible to no reasonable interpretation supporting the jury
verdict."' Id. (quoting Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629,
635 (8th Cir. 1999)).
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2001)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 933-34.
101. Id. at 933 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998)); cf Schnoffstall v. Henderon, 223 F.3d 818, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
grant of summary judgment for employer when plaintiff alleged that her supervisor lost
his temper, swore at her, intimidated her, pounded on desks, and on one occasion lunged
across his desk at her; stating that "[a]lthough this conduct [was] abusive and harassing,
[Vol. 69
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The court noted that "[t]he fundamental issue is whether members of one sex are
subjected to unfavorable conditions of employment that the members of the
opposite sex are not.'1 2 Evidence suggested that some of Booth's offensive
behavior was directed at both female and male employees.' °3 GMC contended
that only five of the incidents Duncan complained of could arguably be based on
sex. 0 The court, however, found this argument lacking, stating "'A plaintiff in
this kind of case need not show . . .that only women were subjected to
harassment, so long as she shows that women were the primary target of such
harassment.'""" Thus, the court concluded that "a jury could reasonably find
that Duncan and her gender were the overriding themes of [the] incidents."'"
GMC next argued that even if the alleged harassment was haed on sex, it
was not "so severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of
Duncan's employment."' 07 The court agreed with GMC; thus Duncan had to
show that her workplace was permeated with insult, ridicule and discriminatory
intimidation to fall within the purview of Title VII.'I 8 The court went on to say
that "'[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."'109 The court
stated that in order to determine whether behavior is sufficiently severe and
pervasive to constitute hostile environment sexual harassment it "look[s] to the
totality of the circumstances, including the 'frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." ' "' The court also stated that it was not the
purpose of Title VII "'to purge the workplace of vulgarity.. '' . It then
mentioned that these standards were in place to "filter out complaints attacking
there is absolutely no evidence it was based on her sex").
102. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 933 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
103. Id.
104. Id. GMC conceded that "(1) Booth's proposition for a 'relationship'; (2)
Booth's touching of Duncan's hand; (3) Booth's request that Duncan sketch his planter;
(4) the Man Hater's Club poster; and (5) Booth's request that Duncan type the He-Men
Women Haters beliefs" might arguably be based on Duncan's sex. Id. at 933-34.
105. Id. at 934 (quoting Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2001)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 1999)).
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998)).
110. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
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the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive
language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.""' 2
The court acknowledged the evidence presented could prove Duncan was
upset and embarrassed by the "derogatory" poster and that she was disturbed by
Booth's sexual advances toward her and his "boorish" behavior; but reasoned
that as a matter of law, Duncan failed to show that Booth's conduct in the
aggregate was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would find the
terms or conditions of Duncan's employment had been affected." 3 To support
its decision that Booth's behavior did not reach the level necessary to meet the
high threshold required for hostile environment sexual harassment, the court
cited several federal cases in which it believed the facts equally, if not more,
egregious than the circumstances of Duncan's situation. 1"' While Booth's
112. Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)
(quotation marks omitted)).
113. Id. The court cited Scusa v. Nestle US.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir.
1999), which stands for the proposition that experiencing "unpleasant conduct and rude
comments" does not equal severe or pervasive harassment that alters the terms or
conditions of employment.
114. Id. at 934-35. The court cited several cases to support its holding that the
circumstances in Duncan's case were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a finding
of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id. (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872-74 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that several incidents
including statements that the plaintiff's elbows were the same color as her nipples and
that she had big thighs, repeated touching of her arm, and attempts to look down her
dress, were insufficient to support hostile work environment claim when they occurred
over a two year period); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353,357, 361-62 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that when employee made sexual jokes aimed at the plaintiff, told
her not to wave at police officers "because people would think she was a prostitute,"
commented about low-necked tops, leered at her breasts, and touched her arm, fingers,
or buttocks on four occasions the behavior in the aggregate was not sufficient to support
the hostile environment claim); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 823-24, 826
(6th Cir. 1997) (when employee reached across plaintiff, stating "[n]othing I like more
in the morning than sticky buns" while staring at her suggestively, suggested to her that
land be named "Hootersville," "Titsville," or "Twin Peaks"; and asked "weren't you there
Saturday night dancing on the tables?" while discussing property near a biker bar, the
court held the behavior to be offensive, but not sufficient to support a hostile
environment claim); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333,337 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding no sexual harassment when plaintiffs supervisor asked her for dates, asked
about her personal life, called her a "dumb blond," put his hand on her shoulder several
times, placed "I love you" notes on her work station, and attempted to kiss her three
times); see also Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that a solitary dinner invitation from plaintiff s supervisor did not amount
to hostile work environment claim even though it made the plaintiff uncomfortable);
Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming motion for
summary judgment in employer's favor when plaintiff claimed that over a three-year
[Vol. 69
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actions "were boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly immature," they were not
severe enough to create "an objectively hostile work environment permeated
with sexual harassment.""' 5
The court focused on the fact that Duncan presented only four categories
of harassing conduct which were based on her sex: one request for a
relationship, four or five incidents where Booth briefly touched her hand, a
request to draw a planter for an illustrator's position, and teasing, including a
poster and beliefs for an imaginary club."6 The court concluded that although
Booth's behavior made Duncan uncomfortable, his conduct did not meet the
standard for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 7 The court held that
as a matter of law Duncan did not show harassment sufffi.ienty cp'p or
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment, necessary
requirements for a sexual harassment hostile environment claim.'
B. The Dissent
Judge Richard S. Arnold dissented from the majority opinion concluding
the harassment suffered by Duncan was sufficiently severe and pervasive for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Booth's conduct had altered a term, condition
or privilege of Duncan's employment.' Judge Arnold concluded that Booth
subjected Duncan to a series of incidents of harassment, "going far beyond
'gender-related jokes and occasional teasing."""0 He believed the conclusion by
the jury, that Booth's offensive behavior created an objectively hostile work
environment, was supported by ample evidence.'
In supporting this conclusion, Judge Arnold noted that Duncan was
propositioned by her supervisor within days of starting her employment with
GMC, the sexual advancement occurred during work hours, and the
advancement was a direct request for a sexual relationship. 2 Judge Arnold
referred to the statement by the majority that the incident was a "single request"
period her supervisor constantly used the words "bitch," "fuck," and "asshole"; a
company official spoke negatively about the feminist movement; a company official
pulled plaintiff close to him and made sexual advances; and two company officials
commented that the plaintiff had "great legs").
115. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
119. Id. at 936 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998)).
121. Id. at 937 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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by Booth. 23 He believed "[t]his description minimizes the effect of the sexual
advance on Ms. Duncan's working conditions."'124 To further this point, he relied
on facts which indicated Booth became hostile to Duncan, increased his criticism
of her work, and degraded her professional capabilities in front of coworkers in
the months following her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with him.'25
Judge Arnold noted, "Significantly, there is no suggestion that this hostile
behavior occurred before Ms. Duncan refused his request for sex."' 26 He went
on to say that this was only the beginning of the harassment Duncan suffered at
the hands of Booth based on her sex, noting the physical touching, social
humiliation and emotional intimidation suffered by Duncan.'27 Judge Arnold
then proceeded to discuss the Eighth Circuit's own jurisprudence, which could
suggest that Duncan experienced enough sexual harassment to reach the
threshold necessary for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. 28
Judge Arnold stated that the Eighth Circuit has "acknowledged that'[t]here
is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct, so
a jury's decision must generally stand unless there is trial error."" '29 He then
went on to say that the Eighth Circuit has "ruled that '[o]nce there is evidence
of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the
conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.""30 Thus,
Judge Arnold believed that the court erred when it decided as a matter of law that
123. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting). More specifically, Judge Arnold relied on
evidence claiming Booth touched Duncan's hand on several occasions, singled her out
as a "Man Hater" who must always be in control of sex, and required her to draw a
"vulgar planter" in order to be considered for a promotion. He described this as "an
unfair choice that would likely intimidate a reasonable person from seeking further career
advancement." Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 938 (Arnold, J., dissenting). Judge Arnold also distinguished the
precedent relied upon by the majoritynoting that in Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990
F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff did not allege her duties or evaluations were
different because of sex; noting that in Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 168
F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999), the court relied on the absence of a claim that the plaintiff was
professionally incompetent because of her sex in affirming the motion for summary
judgment; and distinguishing Black v. Zaring Homes, 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997), by
acknowledging that in Black the comments were not directed specifically at the plaintiff.
Id. at 937 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
129. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 938 (Arnold, J., dissenting) (quoting Hathaway v.
Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1998)).
130. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting) (quoting Howard v. Bums Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d
835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998)).
[Vol. 69
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/11
TITLE VII
the jury acted unreasonably in finding that Duncan faced severe or pervasive
harassment creating a hostile work environment. 3'
V. COMMENT
It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a bright line rule to determine
if and when hostile environment sexual harassment has occurred. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applies the somewhat ambiguous
precedent of the United States Supreme Court by requiring that the harassment
be so severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of
employment. The Eighth Circuit also applies the Supreme Court's "totality of
the circumstances" test, which includes consideration of "social context."' 32
Thus, the issue is whether the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth
by the Supreme Court was intended to include consideration of the work
atmosphere; more specifically, a professional atmosphere versus a blue-collar
work environment, such as a construction sight or an automobile factory. While
the Eighth Circuit does not explicitly adopt the approach taken by the Tenth
Circuit, it seems apparent that through its analysis of recent cases the court does
take into consideration the entire work environment in which the alleged
harassment occurs, and not just the social context of the actual conduct.'
The Tenth Circuit approach was established prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Oncale. Oncale does not, however, clear up the confusion among the
lower courts because Oncale neither adopts nor rejects the Tenth Circuit's
approach. The confusion exists because there are at least two interpretations of
"social context" and "totality of the circumstances." On one hand the language
of Oncale can be interpreted to mean the social context of actions taken in the
workplace (the Sixth Circuit approach). On the other hand the language in
Oncale can be interpreted to mean the social context of the entire workplace (the
Tenth Circuit approach).'34 This second approach seems to be fueled by the
notion that Title VII is not a general civility code.
While this is true, it is important to consider the overall purpose of Title VII,
which was to open the doors ofworkplaces formerly closed to certain groups and
to provide a work atmosphere that is "free of discriminatory animus."' 35 The
Sixth Circuit notes that the objective and subjective tests set forth "in Harris
sufficiently prevent Title VII from expanding into a general civility code" as
feared by the Tenth Circuit. 36 Significantly, the Sixth Circuit also stated,
131. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
132. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
133. See supra Parts H, I.C.
134. See generally Frank, supra note 50.
135. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 553-64 (6th Cir. 1999).
136. Id. at 564 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
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"While '[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will
enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing... and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile
or abusive,"' it is improper for the court to make judgments as to a woman's
assumption of risk upon entering a hostile environment.'37
In his dissent, Judge Arnold seems to adopt this approach to interpreting the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court. When the alleged behavior of Booth
is considered as a whole, with one incident building on the next, Judge Arnold
found that a reasonable jury could find sufficient severity or pervasiveness. Each
individual incident, viewed separately, is unarguably insufficient; however,
according to the Sixth Circuit approach, it is only necessary for the incidents in
the aggregate to be so severe or pervasive that the conduct alters a term,
condition or privilege of employment. This seems to be the more logical
approach when taking into consideration the purpose of Title VII.
Requiring a higher standard in a work environment because it has a history
of discrimination seems to defeat the purpose of Title VII altogether. Women
who want to work as construction workers should not be forced to run a gauntlet
of lewd comments and remarks because construction sites have a history of such
behavior. Most people would not expect an accountant, doctor or lawyer to
tolerate the level of disrespect many women face in the blue-collar work
environment.
The present standards negatively affect employees as well as employers.'38
Employers who are unsure of what the current standards require may over-
regulate the behavior of employees in fear of being sued.39 Or, employers may
under-regulate because they are unaware of what is required, or because they
assume an employee will not prevail in a harassment claim. 40 Neither situation
is ideal. Furthermore, it is unclear to employees and their attorneys what conduct
could possibly constitute sexual harassment. The result of this uncertainty is that
employees who have suffered egregious treatment may not file suit because of
the belief that it is impossible to prevail when they are employed in a blue-collar
work environment.'4 ' Thisproblem is exacerbated when attorneys must put their
own money on the line to litigate such cases. Because there is no real standard
set forth by the courts to judge conduct in the workplace, it is difficult to fault the
plaintiff or his attorney for bringing claims that do not ultimately succeed. 4"
While it is inefficient to have courts overloaded with baseless claims, it is
137. Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82) (citation omitted).




142. Id. at 511.
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necessary to have the court doors open to those who have been harmed by what
should be actionable sexual harassment.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the law stands, it is unclear to courts, attorneys, employers and
employees what constitutes an actionable hostile environment sexual harassment
claim. Even though the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify what was
meant by "totality of the circumstances" in Oncale, it only reaffirmed its
previous ambiguous "social context" standard. As it stands now, if you are a
female working for a construction crew or a factory, be prepared, because in
choosing such an environment you are in danger of being harassed without the
protection of the law in the Eighth Circuit.
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